Doling Out Credit For The Rays Rapid Rise

After so many years of haplessness and embarrassment, the Rays have stunningly

clinched a playoff spot. While there was much press dedicated to the laughably naive and borderline inept new regime in Tampa----owner Stuart Sternberg; president Matthew Silverman and GM Andrew Friedman----if they're going to get the blame when

things go badly, they have to get the credit when things go well. In reality, though, how much of the sudden rise is due to the savvy of the front office? How much is due to luck? And how much is due to all those years of having the number one pick in the draft? Let's take a look at the roster and how they were acquired before running out to vote for Friedman as Executive of the Year:

• Players acquired by the previous regime of owner Vince Naimoli, Chuck LaMar:

Left Fielder Carl Crawford----selected in the second round of the 1999 draft.

Center Fielder B.J. Upton----selected in the first round of hte 2002 draft.
DH/OF Jonny Gomes----selected in the 18th round of the 2001 draft.
OF Rocco Baldelli----selected in the first round of the 2000 draft.
RHP James Shields----selected in the 16th round of the 2000 draft.
RHP Andy Sonnanstine----selected in the 13th round of the 2004 draft.
LHP Scott Kazmir----acquired from the New York Mets in July, 2004.
RHP Jason Hammel----selected in the 10th round of the 2002 draft.

• Players acquired by the new regime through smart moves:

Catcher Dioner Navarro----acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers in June, 2006.
Shortstop Jason Bartlett----acquired from the Minnesota Twins in November, 2007.
RHP Matt Garza----acquired from the Minnesota Twins in November, 2007.

OF Gabe Gross----acquired from the Milwaukee Brewers in April, 2008.
DH Cliff Floyd----signed as a free agent in December, 2007.
INF Willy Aybar----acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers in June, 2006.
RHP Edwin Jackson----acquired from the Los Angeles Dodgers in January, 2006.
INF Ben Zobrist----acquired from the Houston Astros in July, 2006.
RHP Dan Wheeler----acquired from the Houston Astros in July, 2007.
LHP J.P. Howell----acquired from the Kanas City Royals in June, 2006.
RHP Chad Bradford----acquired from the Baltimore Orioles in August, 2008.
LHP Trever Miller----signed as a free agent in February, 2008.

• Players acquired and successful through pure luck and high draft picks:

3B Evan Longoria----drafted in the first round of the 2006 draft.
RHP Troy Percival----signed as a free agent in November, 2006.

1B Carlos Pena----signed as a free agent in February, 2007.
2B Akinori Iwamura----purchased from Japan in December, 2006.
OF/INF/DH Eric Hinske----signed to minor league contract in February, 2008.
RHP Grant Balfour----acquired from Milwaukee Brewers in June, 2007.

With all due respect to what they've accomplished, this success isn't a function of manager Joe Maddon suddenly going from a guy who was too smart and too quirky for his own good and had a long run working for the Angels in various capacities; nor does it have anything to do with the new age, sabermetrics, and fresh eyes of the baseball neophytes who took over the team in 2005. It has to do with building from what was already there; having some luck with a few journeymen; and making obvious draft picks that a monkey could've picked out of a hat. Guys like Iwamura, Balfour, Hinske and Pena were guys who were given away and/or picked up because of their availability at a cheap price. Iwamura was a guy from Japan they probably hadn't the faintest idea about. The journeyman Pena was

almost released at the end of spring training in 2007 and had an MVP quality year. Balfour had a fastball and little else. Hinske has bounced from team-to-team as a guy who could provide some pop in a part-time role. Percival is injury-prone and they're lucky they've gotten as much as they have from him. Much of this success has been due to everything falling into place at once and (I believe) that veteran baseball man Gerry Hunsicker is finally having his suggestions implemented.
The Rays are going to go one of two ways in the playoffs. They're either going to go in without pretense and play with a carefree attitude not realizing the gravity of what they're up against going from where they were last season to where they are now; before they know it, they'll steamroll whoever's in front of them and just keep winning. Or they're going to get to the playoffs, be overwhelmed and get blasted out before they know what's happening.
The front office, manager, coaches and players can bask in what they've done for the next week----they deserve it----but before becoming too impressed with themselves as having been "proven" right, they'd better realize that there was a lot of uncontrollable aspects to this story that had nothing to do with intelligence and a lot to do with pure luck.

American League 4-National League 3 (15 innings)

• The game itself:
  

This was a beautifully played game; well-pitched; (mostly) well-defended; and (mostly) well managed as both sides walked the tightrope trying to win and get as many players into the game as humanly possible; but again, the whole problem of trying to walk that tightrope comes up repeatedly.
Miguel Tejada looked like a player on a mission to show the world that he didn't need

PEDs to perform at a high level; Dan Uggla's defensive gaffes proved why Joe Girardi wanted to play him in left field in the spring of 2006 and why his future is likely at a corner position on the infield or outfield; the pitchers wriggled in and out of trouble and picked up their teammates when necessary; and it ended appropriately on a close play at the plate on a sacrifice fly. Even though this was nearly a five hour marathon, it was only because it went fifteen innings and not because it was dragged out by interminable commercials and other delays like many of these games are; had the game ended in nine innings, it would've been an early end (time-wise), especially for an All Star game.
Despite the American League's supposed superiority after winning these eleven games in a row, the idea that they're the "dominant" league is a misnomer because the majority of the wins haven't been dominating performances; they've almost all been competitive and hinged on one or two plays or performances that they AL has gotten and the NL hasn't at crucial times.

• The management from the commissioner's office on down:

Jayson Stark's report on the game included this little nugget from the commissioner, relayed to the managers during the game:

"...the commissioner's people send word to your people that this game must be decided somehow..."

That's all well-and-good, but what would Bud Selig's suggestion have been to Terry

Francona or Clint Hurdle if it went much farther and either had run out of pitchers? If I were Rays owner Stuart Sternberg, I would've been on the phone with Selig after Scott Kazmir's second inning (especially since he started shaking his arm and losing the strike zone) and said in no uncertain terms, "my pitcher's not going back out there and I don't care what you do to me or what you have to do for another pitcher". Not only did Kazmir throw over 100 pitches on Sunday, he's got a history of arm problems and is on a reeling team that's in contention for a playoff spot. There was always a possibility, if left unchecked, that the adrenaline of the situation and desire to impress his teammates and fans that Kazmir

was going to go overboard and try to throw too hard as Pedro Martinez did years ago; Scott Kazmir's arm and career is more important than coming to a conclusion in the All Star game.
The fine line that managers try to walk in the new era of the All Star game "counting" does more harm than good. Joe Buck and Tim McCarver on the Fox broadcast brought up an excellent point about Francona having to be concerned with not only winning the game, but handling another team's players (especially a division rival) and keeping them healthy. Clint Hurdle handled the pitching staff for the NL better than Francona did for the AL; but I'm wondering why Hurdle didn't bunt in the ninth and eleventh innings when the NL got the leadoff batter on, but decided to bunt in the twelfth. It made no sense; why bunt at one point and not the other?

• The nonsense of the All Star game "counting":

The whole fallacy of the game "counting" for something is an attempt to trick people who don't pay attention to the game for its perceived lack of meaning into watching it. In reality, the home field advantage in the World Series is meaningless. This isn't football, basketball, hockey or soccer; baseball is not a sport in which simply playing at home is going to be a determining factor in the outcome of the game. Of course there are strategic decisions----the DH for example----that are affected by the venue, but it's way down on the list of reasons why a team wins or loses. We're talking about one game out of a possible seven; instead of three maximum games at home, the winning league gets four----it's not likely to make that much of a difference either way.
What the idea of making the game "count" for something has done is put the managers in the situation of having the straddle the line of trying to win for their league, protecting their players and getting everyone possible into the game. It's another half-baked attempt to drum up interest in what amounts to an exhibition game that should be taken seriously, but in a more lighthearted way than the suggestion of the game "counting" dictates.